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ARTICLE 
ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADJUSTING 
PRISONER CENSUS DATA IN CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING: MARYLAND'S TEST CASE 
By: Michelle Davis* 
The issue of prisoner populations in redistricting presented itself for 
the first time on a national scale this redistricting cycle. Columbia 
University School of Law professor Nathaniel Persily was one of the first 
to predict a critical mass in a movement that had long subsisted in the 
backwater of voter advocacy circles, taking a backseat to more 
cognizable campaigns for voter access and non-discrimination. He 
observed in a recent Cardozo Law Review article, "[h]ow and where the 
census counts prisoners is likely to be the subject of much debate 
surrounding the 2010 Census."} 
In most states prisoners cannot vote? Maryland is one of the majority 
of states that denies the franchise to inmates? The movement to count 
prisoners at their previous residences however, does not center on 
prisoner rights, instead it focuses on the representation rights of the 
communities that those prisoners come from. The crux of the argument 
in favor of the practice is that most inmates are displaced residents from 
urban communities incarcerated in institutions mostly located in rural 
areas.4 Most states, with no way of knowing exactly how many prisoners 
the U.S. Census counted or their previous addresses, would count an 
entire prison inmate population toward the total population of a U.S. 
Congressional or legislative district.s For example, the Commissioner 
Districts in Somerset County, Maryland, includes one African-American 
* Michelle Davis, J.D., is a Senior Policy Analyst for the Maryland Department of 
Legislative Services 
1 Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, 
and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 755, 786 (2011). 
2 The Sentencing Project, The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United 
States (Oct. 1998), http://www.sentencingproject.orgldoclFileIFVRlfd _Iosingthevote.pdf. 
3 MD. GEN. ASSEMB.,W A YS AND MEANS COMM., DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERV., Fiscal and Policy 
Note, H.B. 603,(2006). 
4 Persily, supra note 1, at 787. 
5 ld. Before the 2010 census, this data was known as the "Advanced Group Quarters Table." 
ld. at 788, n. 123. Such data was released after the redistricting data and thus was not 
available for use by states. Id.787-88. 
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majority district; however, less than 34% of its population is eligible to 
vote; the rest are inmates of the Eastern Correctional Institution.6 
Election districts all over the country are replete with examples of 
what has come to be known as the "prison gerrymandering" effect. 7 In 
general, political districts with prisons located within them significantly 
reduce the number of eligible voters in that district compared to districts 
without these large prison institutions. This disparity in eligible voter 
populations produces several distortions that affect voting rights. First, 
the most basic claim of prison gerrymandering opponents is that it 
distorts relative voting power, that is, votes in prison districts weigh more 
than votes from non-prison districts.8 For instance, a vote in Somerset 
County's Commissioner District 1 prior to Maryland's prisoner 
reallocation law was worth 2.7 times that of votes in neighboring 
districts. 9 A similar rationale informed the U.S. Supreme Court's 
reasoning as it formulated its now famous "one person, one vote line" of 
cases: 
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting 
power of another person in a state-wide election merely because 
he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural 
county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is 
to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are 
to have an equal vote [ ... ]. This is required by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 
Second, the distortion does not affect individual voters alone, prison 
gerrymandering gives more representation in the legislature to certain 
regions within a state. I I Typically, rural regions with less overall 
population and a large prisoner population are over-represented versus 
their more urban counterparts. That is, many cities lose much of their 
6 See generally No Representation Without Population Act: Hearing on S.B. 400 Before the S. 
Educ., Health, & Envtl. Affairs Comm., Illth Congo (2010) (written statement of the 
Maryland American Civil Liberties Union discussing Somerset County's 1985 consent decree 
under the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 creating commissioner district I as a remedial 
African-American majority-minority district). 
7 PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, The Census Count and Prisons: the Problem, the Solutions and 
What the Census Can Do (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.demos.org/sites/defaultifiles/publicationsIFACTSHEET_PBG_ WhatCensusCanD 
o _Demos. pdf (hereinafter "The Census Count and Prisons"). One of the more extreme 
examples offered by the Prison Policy Initiative is the city of Anamosa, Iowa. A candidate for 
city council won a seat after a total of two (write-in) votes were cast. In Anamosa, 96% of the 
district was comprised of prisoners incarcerated in a nearby prison. Id. 
sId. 
9 See generally No Representation Without Population Act: Hearing on S.B. 400 Before the S. 
Educ., Health, & Envtl. Affairs Comm., Illth Congo (2010) (statement of Peter Wagner, Exec. 
Dir. Prison Policy Inst.). 
10 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). 
II The Census Count and Prisons, supra note 7. 
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census population to prisons in rural districts and thus suffer less 
representation in the state legislature as a result. Persily described it this 
way: 
The counting of prisoners in prison can create dramatic disparities 
between districts in their numbers of eligible voters. In some 
state legislative districts, for example, over ten percent of the 
population resides in prison. The disparities can be even greater 
at the local level. In twenty-one counties in the country, over 
twenty percent of the population is in prison, leading to huge 
variations in eligible voter populations between districts. 12 
Third, and even more intriguing, is the question of whether the distortion 
caused by counting prisoners as residents of the institutions they are 
incarcerated in implicates the Voting Rights Act. As Persily notes, the 
counting of prisoners can also have a racially disparate impact: "[i]n 
several states, such as New York and Illinois, the prison population is 
heavily minority and from urban centers, while prisons are located in 
rural, largely white counties.,,13 
Maryland has large prison institutions in Western Maryland and on the 
Eastern Shore. Hagerstown Correctional Institution's prison population 
comprises nearly 14% of the population of State Legislative District 2C. 14 
The prison population of the Eastern Correctional Institution in Somerset 
County makes up 7% of Legislative Sub-District 38A. 15 Much of the 
population gains of Western Maryland and the Eastern Shore from these 
prison populations have been at the expense of Baltimore City, which has 
been losing representation in the State Legislature since the 1980'S.16 
12 Persily, supra note 1, at 787. 
13 Id. 
14 See Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4 at 7, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) 
(ECF No. 33-5) (hereinafter "Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4"); see also STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF 
PLANNING, REpORT OF MD. PRECINCT POPULATION DATA: 2010 CENSUS, ADJUSTED MD. 
REDISTRICTING DATA & UNADJUSTED CENSUS POPULATION COUNT, App. 8-1 (2010) 
(hereinafter "MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING"). Census 2010 data showed 6,127 prisoners in the 
Hagerstown facility and a total (unadjusted) population of 43,292 in the state's 2002 
Legislative Sub-District 2C, where the Hagerstown facility is located. See Karl Aro Dec\. Ex. 
4 at 7. 
15 See MD. DEP'TOF PLANNING, supra note 14, at App. 8-1. Census 2010 data showed 3,254 
prisoners in the Eastern Correctional facility and a total (unadjusted) population of 45,791 in 
the state's 2002 Legislative Sub-District 2C where the facility is located. See Karl Aro Decl., 
supra note 14, at 7; see also MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, supra note 14, at App. B-1. 
16 See generally Legislative Election Districts, MD. GEN. ASSEMB. (2012), available at 
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanuaIl07Ieg/map/htmllmap.html. Baltimore City's 
representation in the legislature has steadily declined over the past few decades. In 1992, 
Baltimore City comprised all or part of eight legislative districts. See STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF 
PLANNING, MD. 1992 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (2012), available at 
http://www.mdp.state.md.usIMSDClRedistlLegd92/92ldmdid.htm.In 2002, it was only 
included in 6 districts, and only 5.2 districts in 2012. See STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, 
MD. 2002 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (2012), available at 
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Dale Ho, Assistant Counsel at the NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, suggested in a 2011 Stanford Law & Policy Review 
article that prison gerrymandering could be characterized as a minority 
vote dilution claim under Section Two of the 1964 Voting Rights ACt. 17 
Heretofore, Section Two claims have followed a fairly structured legal 
test under Thornburg v. Gingles, which requires the existence of specific 
factors that pin a plaintiffs success on whether a remedy is available. IS 
Historically, that remedy has been the creation of a majority-minority 
district to protect minority representation rights. 19 In the context of 
prisoner gerrymandering however, the remedy would encompass 
reallocating prisoners back to their previous residences and potentially 
equalizing the relative voting power between communities with and 
without prisoner populations.2o Despite a general recognition of prisoner 
populations as an issue for redistricting in 2010, and a few scholarly 
musings about the legal theories a court might apply to the effects of 
prison gerrymandering, there were several key events leading up to 
Maryland's 2010 passage of its prisoner reallocation law. 
A key to educating the public and drawing attention to the prisoner 
problem in representation has been the Prison Policy Initiative.21 This 
ten-year old non-profit organization seeks to document "how mass 
incarceration skews democracy.,,22 The issue arose when prison 
population growth in the United States contributed to increased distortion 
in state and 10callegislatures.23 The group cites Anamosa, Iowa, where a 
prison makes up nearly 100% of a local city council district, as its most 
compelling example of the unfairness of counting prison populations 
within one district.24 Thus, only a handful of voters control the 
representation of an entire city council seat.25 While the effects of the 
practice are not this dramatic in most jurisdictions, it impacts varying 
degrees of representational rights in nearly every state. 
http://www.mdp.state.md.usIPDF/OurProductslRedistrictl20021d _ courtappeals _62102_ MD_ 
map_web.pdf; see STATE OF MD. DEP'TOF PLANNING, MD. 2012 LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS 
(2012), available at 
http://planning.maryland.govIPDFlRedistrictingl2010mapslLegiStatewide.pdf. 
17 Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current 
Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 355, 388 (2011). 
18 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986). 
19 Id. at 76. 
20 Ho, supra note 17, at 387-88. 




24 The Census Count and Prisons, supra note 7. 
25 Id. 
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Although the sudden popularity of prisoner reallocation this 
redistricting cycle was greatly influenced by a groundswell of support 
from good government advocacy groups, the key to its success was a 
more practical one. The United States Census Bureau's operational 
decision to make the requisite data available to rectify the prison problem 
made prison reallocation possible?6 This was undoubtedly a response to 
advocates hoping to end prisoner gerrymandering.27 In April of2011, the 
Census Bureau announced that it would, for the first time, make detailed 
prison population data from its 20 I 0 census count available in time for 
decennial redistricting activity in the states.28 This "group-quarters" data 
would allow states and localities to identify prisons according to their 
locations within census geography, and obtain detailed demographic 
information about the prisoner population.29 
This policy change by the Census Bureau was made in spite of many 
pleas by the advocacy community and other stakeholders to end its policy 
of counting prisoners as residents of the prisons.3o However, the Census 
Bureau insists that after much research and deliberation, changing its 
practice would be too cumbersome and expensive to implement.3l In its 
view, ascertaining the previous addresses of prisoners was beyond the 
scope of Census Bureau operations. 32 
Where the Census Bureau created "opportunity," the Second Circuit 
created legal legitimacy when it mentioned prison gerrymandering in the 
2006 decision Hayden v. Pataki. 33 Hayden involved an unsuccessful 
26 2010 Census Advance Group Quarters Summary File, Census of Population and Housing, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU I-I (Apr. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/gqsf.pdf; see 
Peter Wagner, Census Bureau Releases Group Quarters Data, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS 
BLOO (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2012/10/26/nacreop-
testimony. 
27 See Wagner, supra note 26. 
28 2010 Census Advance Group Quarters Summary File, supra note 26, at I-I. In the past, 
this data file would be distributed long after most states completed redistricting. See Wagner, 
supra note 26. 
29 See generally 2010 Census Advance Group Quarters Summary File, supra note 26, at G-2 
(stating that the residence rule is used to determine where people should be counted during the 
census, and that people who do not have a usual residence (or cannot be determined), a usual 
residence should be counted based on their current location). 
30 See, e.g., The Problem, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orglimpact.html(last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
31 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABULATINO PRISONERS AT THEIR "PERMANENT HOME OF 
RECORD" ADDRESS, 1-2 (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http:// 
http://www.census.gov/newsroomlreleases/pdf/2006-02-21_tabulating-.prisoners.pdf 
("Counting prisoners at a 'permanent home of record' address, rather than at their place of 
incarceration, would result in increased cost both to the decennial census program and to the 
federal, state, and local correctional facilities that would be required to participate in data 
collection efforts. Our study raises concerns that this change would result in decreased 
accuracy for a possibly large proportion of millions of individuals confined on Census day. "). 
32 The Census Count and Prisons, supra note 7, at G-2. 
33 Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305,341-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (en bane). 
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challenge to New York's felon disenfranchisement law.34 In this case, the 
plaintiffs represented a class of Black and Latino incarcerated felons and 
parolees in New York state prisons who claimed that the state statutes 
disenfranchising them are covered by the Voting Rights Act, and those 
statutes violated Section Two of the Act by diluting minority voting 
power.35 The Second Circuit, sitting en bane, affirmed the lower court's 
holding that the Voting Rights Act did not cover New York's 
disenfranchisement law, but the court pondered an issue not explicitly 
raised by the plaintiffs: 
It is unclear whether plaintiffs' vote dilution claim also 
encompasses a claim on behalf of plaintiffs who are neither 
incarcerated nor on parole, that their votes are "diluted" because 
of New York's apportionment process, [ ... ], which counts 
incarcerated prisoners as residents of the communities in which 
they are incarcerated, and has the alleged effect of increasing 
upstate New York regions' populations at the expense of New 
York City's. Plaintiffs' complaint does not raise this claim 
explicitly, though it is briefly alluded to in their submissions 
before this Court.36 
Without briefs or any consideration of this issue by the District Court, the 
majority opinion ordered the case be remanded to consider this issue.37 A 
trial never resumed on remand after plaintiffs declined to go any further 
with the claim, but the few lines written by the Second Circuit Court 
appeared to gamer national attention.38 In May 2006, a New York Times 
editorial lauded the court for recognizing the issue.39 For advocacy 
groups, the court's musings became a clarion call for reform.4o 
The Supreme Court interpreted the United States Census Act to 
require use of the 100% decennial census count for purposes of 
apportioning the United States House of Representatives, rather than 
implementing statistical sampling and other survey data products 
provided by the Census Bureau.41 This bright-line rule does not apply to 
34 ld. 
35 Id. at 311. 
36 Id. at 328-29 (citing N.Y. CaNST. art. III, § 4). 
37 Hayden, 449 F.3d at 329. 
38 Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2006 WL 2242760 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006). 
39 Editorial, Prison-Based Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml2006/05/20/opinionl20sat3.html? J= I. 
40 New York to End Prisoner Gerrymandering, PRO SE (Prisoners' Legal Services of New 
York), Summer 2010, at 3, available at http://www.plsny.orgiPro_Se_-_8-25.pdf. 
41 Persily, supra note I, at 758-60. In Dept. o/Commerce v. u.s. House 0/ Representatives, 
the court found that 13 U.S.C. § 195 prohibits the use of statistical sampling for purposes of 
reapportioning the U.S. House of Representatives under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution. Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. H.R., II F.Supp.2d 76,79 (D.D.C. 1999); see 
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the data distributed to states for redistricting purposes.42 When it comes 
to redistricting, which is performed at the state level, the overwhelming 
convention by states is to use the same unadjusted census data produced 
by the Census Bureau for Congressional apportionment.43 Thus, by 
default, most jurisdictions use total population as the base from which it 
redraws electoral lines.44 However, unlike Congressional apportionment, 
there is no legal precedent providing a bright-line rule that defines a 
"constitutionally acceptable" population base for redistricting purposes.45 
Indeed, there are many potential population bases: voting age population, 
citizen population, registered voters, residents, nonfelons and more, some 
of which involving tweaking census data.46 Since 1988, Kansas has 
routinely modified census total population data by extracting college 
students and military non-residents for legislative redistricting.47 
Hayden seemed to open the door to the idea that prison populations 
could substantially affect representational rights, but Federal courts 
remained silent on the question of excluding or moving prisoners in the 
redistricting process until the Fourth Circuit Court's decision in Fletcher 
v. Lamone.48 The U.S. Supreme Court and various federal circuits over 
the years have sparingly meandered into the political thicket to consider 
the use of under count estimates, voter registration rolls, and citizen voting 
age population data.49 The two recurring themes in each of these 
scenarios seem to be the availability and reliability of the data used; and 
the resulting difference between the adjusted and the traditional data set.50 
Generally, courts have given the states wide discretion when engaging 
in political line-drawing.51 Until 1964, the question of courts 
adjudicating a state's congressional or legislative district map was 
generally u.s. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
(Apr. 2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/survey _ methodology/acs _design_methodology. 
pdf. There is some debate on what constitutes sampling. See generally Persily, supra note I, 
at 758 (discussing the debate on "sampling"). 
42 Persily, supra note I, at 759. 
43 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, II (2009). 
44 See id. 
45 Persily, supra note I, at 763. 
46 Id. 
47 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-301-2 (2001). 
48 See generally Hayden, 449 F.3d at 341-42; see generally Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 
2d 887 (D. Md. 20 II). However, Federal courts have heard cases centering on other types of 
adjusted Census data and alternate datasets. See generally Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 
222 (1985). 
49 See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) ("Courts ought not to enter this political 
thicket."). 
50 See REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43 at THE CENSUS, 10 (2009) ("Federal courts 
have upheld the use of alternative population bases for redistricting if the alternative database 
is used uniformly and if the results are comparable to those produced by a census population-
based plan."). 
51 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552. 
42 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 43.1 
considered to be one of a "peculiarly political nature" outside of the 
court's jurisdiction.52 After the court's turnaround in Baker v. Carr, it 
embraced jurisdiction for violations of the constitution.53 However, the 
Court did not preempt the entire redistricting process: 
"From the beginning, we have recognized that reapportionment is 
primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, 
and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a 
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional 
requisites [ ... ]." 54 
Since Baker, the Supreme Court has delved deeper into redistricting 
controversies, and it has recognized census data as the "best population 
data available" for purposes of redistricting.55 But, the Court has 
emphasized that it is the accuracy and reliability of the data that is 
dispositive in those cases, not its status as official census data. 56 In 
Karcher, the Supreme Court rejected deviations in New Jersey's 
Congressional district populations meant to correct for the census 
undercount. 57 While the court recognized a confirmed historical 
undercount in censuses throughout the years, and acknowledged New 
Jersey's right to correct for that when redistricting, the process by which 
it accomplishes that must produce reliable, accurate results.58 Adjusting 
census data reliably and accurately requires execution of a coherent, well-
documented and even-handed policy. In Karcher, New Jersey line-
drawers had attempted to compensate for a 1 % census undercount by 
allowing for deviations between districts of 1 %.59 Of course, this did 
nothing to reduce the overall undercount of individuals in the state or 
between districts.60 The court underscored the need for states to carefully 
tailor adjustments to census data to so that it actually improves the 
accuracy of population totals: 
Unless some systematic effort is made to correct the distortions 
inherent in census counts of total population, deviations from the 
norm of population equality are far more likely to exacerbate the 
52 Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552. 
53 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
54 White, 412 U.S. at 794. 
55 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 
526 (1969». 
56 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 738. 
57 Jd. at 731. 
58 Jd. at 741. 
59 See id. at 740 (stating that the plan did not come "as nearly as practicable to population 
equality"). 
60 Jd. at 736. 
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differences between districts. If a State does attempt to use a 
measure other than total population or to "correct" the census 
figures, it may not do so in a haphazard, inconsistent, or 
conjectural manner.6! 
As early as 1966, the Supreme Court grudgingly upheld a Hawaiian 
legislative apportionment plan based on the state's registered voters 
instead of the Census Bureau's total population counts.62 The reasoning 
behind the use of this alternate population group was Hawaii's unique 
concentration of non-resident military personne1.63 While the Court 
upheld the plan, it did so with the clear caveat that the voter database 
"substantially" resembled Hawaii's total citizen population.64 The Court 
noted that the registered voter database was not, by definition, a 
permissible dataset since it "depends not only upon criteria such as 
govern state citizenship, but also upon the extent of political activity of 
those eligible to register and vote.,,65 Burns clearly warned against future 
use of such alternative population bases, given the strong correlation 
needed between a registered voter database and more acceptable 
population datasets.66 "Weare not to be understood as deciding that the 
validity of the registered voters basis as a measure has been established 
for all time or circumstances, in Hawaii or elsewhere.,,67 Indeed, in 1982, 
a federal district court found that registered voters in Hawaii no longer 
approximated the citizen population total and overturned a legislative 
plan based on that data.68 
Three years after the United States Supreme Court upheld Hawaii's 
state senate districts, the Court affirmed the District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri ruling, which struck down Missouri's 1967 
Redistricting Act. 69 The redistricting map featured population variances 
above 3% between Congressional districts.70 Missouri's main 
justification had been that the deviations accounted for large military 
populations in some areas of the state, just as had been the case in 
Hawaii.7! However, the Court found the Missouri Legislature'S methods 
lacking, calling its redistricting process "haphazard.,,72 Missouri had not 
61 See id. at 744 (quoting Kirkpatrick. 394 U.S. at 534-35 (1969)). 
62 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,97-98 (1966). 
63 Id. at 94. 
64 Id. at 93. 
65 Id. at 92. 
66 Id. at 92-93. 
67 Id. at 96. 
68 Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp 554, 572 (D. Haw. 1982). 
69 See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 534. 
72 Id. at 535. 
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used voter registration records as was done in Hawaii, but simply made 
"adjustments" to the total population data, something the court found to 
be too unreliable.73 
More recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
question of using citizen voting age population as the basis for 
redistricting.74 In Chen v. City of Houston, the Plaintiffs sued the City of 
Houston's apportionment of its City Council districts. 75 Chen included a 
claim that the City violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause by using total population as the basis for attaining 
proportional representation between districts. 76 While the plaintiffs 
acknowledged that the use of total population was not a per se violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, they argued that significantly large 
concentrations of non-citizens in some districts created electoral 
inequities between eligible voters in districts.77 Thus, when total 
population does not approximate the distribution of the voting eligible 
population, officials are obligated to use a more exacting measurement. 78 
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Chen from prior United States Supreme 
Court's "one-person, one-vote" cases, and instead required jurisdictions 
use a particular population base for redistricting.79 Chen criticized the 
Supreme Court as being "evasive in regard to which population base must 
be equalized," and acknowledged the thorny tension between 
representational equality (equal numbers of individuals per 
representative) and electoral equality (equal numbers of voters per 
representative).80 
Advocates seeking to end prison-based gerrymandering contend that 
counting prisoners where they physically reside for redistricting purposes 
violates both representational and electoral equality.8! It violates 
representational equality because prisoners are not recognized as 
residents of the prison's location in most jurisdictions.82 Electoral 
equality is violated by the fact that these prisoners cannot vote.83 
Additionally, large concentrated populations of non-voters generally 
distort a district's relative voting strength. 84 
73 Id. 
74 Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d. 502 (5th Cir. 2000). 
75 /d. 
76 Id. at 523. 
77 Id. at 522. 
78 Id. at 524. 
79 Id. at 524-525; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see generally Burns, 384 U.S. 
73. 
80 Chen, 206 F.3d at 524. 
81 Ho, supra note 17, at 383. 
82 Id. at 384. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 394. 
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The only thing federal courts have made clear regarding acceptable 
apportionment population bases for redistricting is that the matter is 
simply not settled. Interestingly, the Supreme Court hinted that it is 
agnostic when it comes to picking and choosing what qualifies as 
acceptable and what does not, since such decisions are so deeply 
entwined with more political notions of representation.85 For now, it 
seems the federal bar is more willing to judge the procedural aspects of a 
jurisdiction's choice of population base when it comes to assessing 
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the choice 
itself. 
Maryland's "No Representation without Population" Act requires that 
population counts used for creating legislative districts exclude current 
inmates who were not state residents prior to their incarceration. 86 
Inmates who are state residents must be counted as residents at their last 
known address.87 The Act, enacted in 2010, was broadly supported by 
the civil rights community in the state, with several prominent civil rights 
organizations testifying on its behalf. 88 
In Maryland, as in so many other states, the issue of whether to 
include prison populations was a practical one. Heavily African-
American jurisdictions in the state, namely Baltimore City and Prince 
George's County, had been on a population slide since the 2000 Census.89 
When the Act was adopted, it was very likely that those regions would 
85 Burns, 384 U.S. at 92 ("Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has this 
Court suggested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or 
temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, in the apportionment 
base by which their legislators are distributed and against which compliance with the Equal 
Protection Clause is to be measured. The decision to include or exclude any such group 
involves choices about the nature of representation with which we have been shown no 
constitutionally founded reason to interfere."). 
86 No Representation Without Population Act, ch. 67, 2010 Md. Laws 737, 739. These 
districts include both Congressional and General Assembly legislative districts; along with 
districts used for county and municipal governing bodies. !d. 
87 !d. 
88 Such organizations included the A.c.L.U., the Somerset County N.A.A.C.P., and the 
Maryland Legislative Black Caucus. See Press Release, Somerset County NAACP, SB 400-
No Representation Without Population Act (March 4,2010), available at 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgltestimony/Somerset_ NAACP _ MD _ SB400 _March _4_20 
1O.pdf; see Press Release, Somerset County ACLU, SB 400 - No Representation Without 
Population Act (March 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgltestimony/ACLU_MD _ SB400 _ March_ 4_20 I O.pdf; 
Letter from Del. Veronica Turner, Chair, Legis. Black Caucus of Md., Inc., to the Hon. Joan 
Carter Conway, Chair, Md. Sen. Educ., Health and Envtl. Matters Comrn. (March 4, 20 I 0), 
available at 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgitestimonylLegislative _Black_Caucus _ MD _ SB400 _Mar 
ch_ 4_201O.pdf. 
89 MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, supra note 14, at 52, 79; see MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, REPORT OF 
MD. PRECINCT POPULATION DATA: 2000 CENSUS, MD. CENSUS POPULATION COUNT at 8-16,81-
86. 
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lose representation in the legislature because of population decline.90 
Counting prisoners at their previous horne addresses would mitigate some 
of this loss, although at the time, no one could be sure how much.91 
However, African-American residents of Maryland's Somerset County 
had a more specific and weighty concern.92 During hearings on the Act, 
Somerset County residents testified that the county's five-member 
commission had never elected an African-American preferred candidate, 
despite the county's 42% African-American population and a 70% 
African-American commissioner district.93 The culprit is the Eastern 
Correctional Institution ("ECI"), established in 1987, which houses 
approximately 3,000 prisoners and accounts for 70% of the district's 
population.94 As witnesses pointed out during testimony, their majority-
minority district was only majority black "on paper.,,95 Somerset, being a 
perfect example of the so-called prison gerrymandered district, was key 
in ushering in corrective prisoner reallocation legislation in Maryland.96 
While the No Representation without Population Act was a major 
victory for various constituencies, its language did not address the 
gargantuan task of actually implementing prisoner reallocation 
procedures.97 Approximately one hundred local jurisdictions around the 
country have engaged in prisoner reallocation, but Maryland became the 
first to implement these procedures statewide.98 State officials will have 
to review and verify address records from thirty-three state and federal 
facilities in the state; geocode these addresses for inclusion in a database; 
and then subsequently "adjust" the 2010 U.S. Census data record-by-
record.99 
90 Annie Linskey, Baltimore Loses Clout in Redistricting, BALT. SUN, Dec. 16,2011, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.coml20 11-12-16/news/bs-md-legis-redistrict-20 111214_1_ map-
majority-african-american-districts-legislative-session. 
91 See Ending Prison-Based Gerrymandering would Aid the African American Vote in 
Maryland, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orglfactsheets/mdlafricanamericans.pdf. 
92 Somerset County NAACP, supra note 88. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. "Majority-minority district" a is term of art usually understood to mean "districts where 
a racial minority comprises a voting majority in an electoral district." REDISTRICTING LAW 
2010, supra note 43 at 227. 
96 See Maryland Law Brings Long-Awaited Racial Justice to Somerset County, PRISONERS OF 
THE CENSUS (Aug. 15,2012), 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orglnewsI20 12/08/ 16/somerset-heraldl. 
97 Defendant's Memorandum and Motion to Dismiss at 1-4, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 
2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) (Case 8:II-cv-03220-RWT). 
98 Inside Maryland Politics: Counting Maryland's Prisoners, WYPR, 
http://www.wypr.orglnews/inside-maryland-politics-counting-maryland-prisoners (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2013). See also Local Govt's That Avoid Prison Based Gerrymandering, PRISONERS 
OF THE CENSUS, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.orgilocaV (last visited Oct. 8,2012). 
99 See generally No Representation Without Population Act, ch. 67, sec. I, §8-701, sec. 2-2A-
01, art. 24 §I-III 2010 Md. Laws (local jails were exempted from the Act). 
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Address records of prisoners were reviewed as they existed on the date 
the Census was taken, April I, 20 I 0, to mirror the census data. loo As one 
might expect, many of these records were far from complete or 
accurate. 101 Address collection is not the top priority of prison intake 
officers. Accordingly, state officials began with a database of over 
twenty-thousand inmate names and addresses, many of which needed to 
be corrected, formatted, or supplemented before they were usable under 
the Act. 102 Verification and formatting of proper Maryland addresses was 
crucial for the geocoding process, which involves pinpointing the precise 
geographic location of an address via longitude and latitude; a necessity 
for the actual census data adjustment process. 103 
The address verification process brought about a series of policy and 
practice questions critical to the integrity of the process, most important 
of which was how to treat prisoners with no obtainable address. For 
various reasons, addresses were not obtainable for some prisoners: such 
as rural routes, post office boxes, missing house numbers, homelessness, 
or no address listed. l04 The state adopted regulations to ensure uniformity 
in dealing with each of these situations; and those regulations established 
clear procedures for correcting address information, along with deadlines 
for completing the geocoding. l05 Generally, after "reasonable efforts" are 
made to obtain address information, prisoners with unobtainable 
addresses were given the address of the institution where they were 
currently incarcerated. l06 
Perhaps the most unexpected challenge that faced state officials during 
the reallocation process was the Federal Bureau of Prisons' refusal to 
submit inmate address information for federal prisons located in 
Maryland. l07 Citing privacy concerns, the Department of Justice refused 
the Maryland Attorney General's repeated attempts to obtain the needed 
Federal inmate address data. \08 The result was a stalemate that 
effectively excluded federal prisoners from the entire reallocation 
process. 109 
100 Dec!. of James Cannistra, Ex. 2 at 1, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 
2011)(Case: 8:11-cv-03220-RWT). 
101 [d. at 2. 
102 Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14, at 2. 
103 Act of Aug. 13,2010, ch. 472, § 1,2011 De!. Acts (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 
29 § 804A (2011». Delaware passed a similar law to Maryland but found the process to be 
too cumbersome and expensive for the 2010 redistricting cycle. [d. Delaware amended their 
law in May of 20 II to take effect for the 2020 cycle. /d. 
104 Decl. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14, at 3. 
105 MD. CODE REGS. 34.05.01.04 (2010). 
106 [d. 
107 Dec!. of James Cannistra, supra note 100, at 3. 
108 [d. at 4. 
109 See Dec!. of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14, at 3. 
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The heart of the prisoner reallocation process is the actual 
modification of the database containing the official 2010 U.S. Census 
data's hard count of the population. I \0 This involves modifying the total 
population counts of individual census blocks by extracting prisoners 
from the location of the prison, and adding them to the census blocks 
where their home address is located. I I I In the end, state officials 
reviewed over twenty-two thousand prisoner address records, and 
modified over ten-thousand census block totals. 112 The final adjustment 
of Census data resulted in a population deduction of one thousand, three 
hundred and twenty one nonresident prisoners from the official U.S. 
Census count for Maryland. I 13 Western Maryland's population count was 
reduced by a total of seven thousand, three hundred and sixty five 
individuals who were reallocated or moved to their previous home 
address. I 14 Most of these previous home addresses were located in 
Baltimore and the Washington, D.C. suburbs. 115 
Despite the arduous process of reallocation, the end result did not 
significantly change the state's demographics. 116 The nearly seventeen 
thousand reallocated prisoners represented only 0.3% of the state's 
population. ll7 Under the U.S. Supreme Court's "one-person, one-vote" 
cases, it appears that Maryland's Census data adjustment process 
"approximates" the standard census data totals for the state. This fact 
likely influenced the court's view when considering the legal challenge 
against the congressional map drawn using its numbers. I 18 
Maryland, like most other states, redraws its Congressional districts 
every ten years.119 But, unlike other states, Maryland's governor is given 
the first crack at redrawing the map.120 The highly unusual step is not a 
legal requirement, but a tradition. 121 Maryland's Constitution only 
requires the governor to submit a legislative redistricting map to the 
General Assembly on a pre-determined date. 122 The governor's proposed 
110 Seeld. at 15. 
III Id. 
112 Id. at 14. 
1\3 Id. at 3-4. 
114 2010 Adjusted Census Population, MD DEPT. OF PLANNING, available at 
http://www.planning.maryland.govIPDFlRedistrictingl201 Odocsl AdL 2010_ Tot]op _by _ MD 
CntyReg.pdf, (last visited Oct. 11,2012). 
115 Id. 
116 Decl, of Karl Aro, Ex. 4, supra note 14 at 3-4. 
117 Id. During the process 16,988 prisoners were relocated, bringing the adjusted total 
~opulation for Maryland to 5,772, 231. Id. 
18 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 893-94. 
119 MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5. 
120 Id. 
121 Redistricting Process in Maryland, MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY REAPPORTIONMENT 
AND REDISTRICTING, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/OtherlRedistrictinglRedistricting.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
122 MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5. 
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map then automatically becomes law, unless a supermajority comprised 
of both chambers of the General Assembly enact an alternative legislative 
redistricting map within forty-five days. 123 
The Maryland state constitution does not refer to drawing U.S. 
Congressional districts, thus the U.S. Constitution leaves the General 
Assembly with jurisdiction over this matter. 124 Despite the General 
Assembly's authority to establish Congressional districts for the state, the 
governor has traditionally introduced a Congressional redistricting map in 
companion to the state legislative map.125 However, the General 
Assembly has greater latitude to accept or reject the governor's proposed 
Congressional map.126 The General Assembly may, at any time, pass an 
alternative plan or accept the governor's proposal by a majority vote. 127 
Part of the reason for the gubernatorial tradition of presenting the 
legislature with the Congressional and state legislative redistricting maps 
is due to the Maryland Constitution's public hearing requirement. 128 
Article III, Section 5 of the Maryland Constitution requires the governor 
to prepare the state legislative plan only after "public hearings.,,129 In 
1974, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified this constitutional 
language when it invalidated a state legislative map proposed by the 
governor after one public hearing was held two days prior to its General 
Assembly introduction. 130 The court found that a single public hearing 
was not adequate, and the governor has since appointed an advisory 
committee to hold pre-map and post-map hearings in order to comply 
with the court's holding. 131 The General Assembly appears to be content 
with the governor's process for legislative redistricting, and has 
acquiesced to following the same process for Congressional 
redistricting. 132 
In July 2011, Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley appointed a five 
member advisory committee to submit a map of proposed Congressional 
123 Id. 
124 See U.S. CaNST., art. I, § 4. 
125 Overview a/the 2012 Census Redistricting Data Program, MD. DEPT. OF PLANNING, 
available at http://planning.maryland.gov!PDFlRedistricting/201 Odocs/20 1 OCensRedistdata 
ProgOvrvw. pdf. 




130 In re Legislative Redistricting of the State, 271 Md. 320, 317 A.2d 477 (1974). See 
Memorandum from William H. Adkins, II, Assistant Dir. of Dep't. of Legislative Reference, 
Maryland Gen. Assembly to All Members of the General Assembly (Aug. 1, 1973) (on file 
with author). 
131 Press Release, Takirra Winfield, Governor O'Malley Announces Members of the 
Governor's Redistricting Advisory Comm. (lUI. 4, 2011), available at 
http://planning.maryland.gov!PDF !Press/pressRelease-RedistrictingCommittee07041I. pdf. 
132 Redistricting Process in Maryland, supra note 121. 
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districts. 133 This map was submitted after the committee held twelve 
public hearings across the state, and in time for an October special 
session of the General Assembly. 134 The General Assembly held this 
special session in order to complete the Congressional redistricting 
process in time for the Spring 2012 presidential primaries. 135 The 
Governor's map featured a reconfigured Sixth Congressional District that 
challenged the re-election prospects of the district's long-time Republican 
incumbent Congressman. 136 It also made major changes to districts in 
central Maryland and the Washington suburbs. 137 Legislators passed the 
Governor's proposed map in a three-day session, which prompted the 
filing of several lawsuits by discontented constituents. 138 
The Maryland Constitution lists various standards and requirements 
for drawing state legislative districts, including mandates to construct 
compact districts or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions.139 
However, it is silent in regards to Congressional redistricting, and thus 
any and all legal constriction on Congressional redistricting exists in 
Federal law. 140 Practically speaking, this means that there are no state 
constitutional mandates for drawing Congressional district maps in 
Maryland. 141 The only specific federal statutory requirement for 
Congressional districts is that they be single-member. 142 Thus, the only 
significant legal limitations on the drawing of Congressional districts in 
Maryland are the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and federal case law 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution, specifically, the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. 143 
133 Takirra Winfield, supra note 131. 
134 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. 
135 Redistricting and Reapportionment, MD. DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERVS., available at 
http://mlis.state.md.us/OtheriRedistricting/Redistricting.htm. 
136 Abby Livingston, Maryland Legislature Passes Map Endangering Bartlett, ROLL CALL, 
Oct. 19,2011. 
137 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
138 !d. at 891. 
139 MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5. 
140 Redistricting and Reapportionment, supra note 135. 
141 Id. 
142 See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (1967) (stating that "there shall be established by law a number of 
districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and 
Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more 
than one Representative. "). Before passage of the single-member district requirement, states 
were free to elect some of its congressional representatives at-large under the 
Reapportionment Act of 1929. See generally Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). 
143 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that political districts be equal in population so that a single person's vote would be 
weighed equally in any district); Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. H.R., 525 U.S. 316 (1999) 
(Supreme Court held that reapportionment must be carried out using the Census Bureau's 
actual enumeration and not statistically adjusted data provided by the Census); Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (Supreme Court held that strict population equality is 
required among congressional districts in each state); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 578 
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The vast majority of legal challenges to redistricting plans fall into the 
following categories: 1) equal population; 2) racial gerrymandering; 3) 
political gerrymandering; and 4) violations of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. 144 The equal population requirement, which is the focus of this 
article, stems from both Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (in 
regards to Congressional districts), and the Fourteenth Amendment (for 
legislative and other redistricting maps).145 Both racial and political 
gerrymandering claims arise from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause. 146 Section two of the Voting Rights Act covers 
minority vote dilution claims, as well as redistricting plans deemed to be 
"retrogressive" to minority populations. 147 The Voting Rights Act bans 
redistricting plans that purposely discriminate and have a discriminatory 
effect on minorities. 148 
The grievances claimed in lawsuits against Maryland's 2012 
Congressional redistricting map included all of the above challenges. 149 
Several plaintiffs, mostly minority residents from various regions of 
Maryland, filed suit in Federal District Court and alleged the 2012 
Congressional map discriminated against Maryland minority voters; was 
an illegal partisan gerrymander; and violated the "One Person, One Vote" 
equal population requirement. 15o Plaintiffs alleged that there were 
various impermissible infractions against minority voters. 151 Chief 
among these complaints was the manner that the map used to split 
minority communities in the Baltimore and Prince George's County 
areas. 152 The plaintiffs claimed that some minority communities were 
split in order to create predominantly white districts, which the plaintiffs 
argued was illegal racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 153 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that other minority 
communities were submerged into majority white districts in order to 
dilute the minority vote, and thus violated Section Two of the Voting 
Rights Act. 154 
(1964) (Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires States to "make an 
honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable."). 
144 See generally, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43. 
145 Redistricting and Reapportionment, supra note 135. 
146 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
147 See generally REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43; RACIAL AND LANGUAGE 
MINORITIES 51 (2009). 
148 Jd. 
149 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. 
150 Jd. 
151 See generally, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (2011). 
152 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. 
153 Jd. at 891-92. 
154 Jd. at 897. 
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A three-judge panel of the United States District Court of Maryland 
heard oral arguments on the above claims, and delivered their decision to 
dispose of all of the plaintiffs' claims in Fletcher v. Lamone. 155 In 
Fletcher, the court briefly reviewed and stated its rationale for dismissing 
each claim. 156 Particularly noteworthy are the court's reasons for 
rejecting the equal population challenge, which the court based on the 
state's prisoner reallocation efforts. 157 Plaintiffs appealed the panel's 
decision on the equal population challenge directly to the United States 
Supreme Court, who denied the appeal and summarily affirmed the lower 
court's decision.158 The Court's denial indicates how the Court views 
census data adjustment for prison populations in the context of the Equal 
Protection Clause and the "One Person, One Vote" principle. 159 
Fletcher's racial gerrymandering claim focused on Congressional 
Districts Three and Five. The plaintiffs described District Three as 
containing "finger-like district lines [ ... [that] reach down into Baltimore 
City snatching minority voters, [and] effectively grafting them into a 
majority district within the suburbs.,,160 District Five, located in Prince 
George's County, it claimed "bizarrely hooks left to split off minority 
neighborhoods into three separate districts.,,161 This claim of intentional 
racial discrimination via gerrymandering is based on a distinct group of 
cases stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. 
Reno.162 The Shaw line of cases recognized for the first time that voting 
districts drawn in a way that is so bizarre that the shape itself can be 
prima facie evidence of intentional discrimination, something the Court 
described as drawing district boundaries using race as the primary and 
controlling factor. 163 
155 See Id. at 891. Plaintiffs in the case sued Linda Lamone, the head administrator of 
Maryland's State Board of Elections. Id. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, a three-judge federal 
district court panels has jurisdiction in all reapportionment and Voting Rights Act cases with 
direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). 
156 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. 
157 Id. at 896-97. 
158 Fletcher v. Lamone, 133 S.Ct. 29, 29 (2012). 
159 Report of the Special Master, 2012 Legislative Redistricting of the State, Misc. Nos. 1,2, 
3,4,5,9. Sept. Term, 2012, 3, n. 3 (Sept. 20, 2012) available at 
https:lldocs.google.comlviewer?ur1=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.courts.state.md.us%2Fcoappeals 
%2Fhighlightedcases%2F20 12districting%2Fspecialmastersreport. pdf. 
160 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count 
Three and Six of the Complaint at 16 Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) 
(No. 11-3220). 
161 Id. at 18. 
162 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
163 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Devel. Corp., 42 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) ("Redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on 
its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race' demands the same close scrutiny 
that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.")); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644 (citation 
omitted). Ironically the Shaw line of cases comprised of white plaintiffs seeking redress for 
bizarrely shaped minority-majority districts. In Fletcher, the plaintiffs are minorities. 
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In Shaw's dicta, the Court noted that bizarrely shaped districts alone 
were not necessarily evidence of racial discrimination, but that such 
districts indicate that traditional districting principles were secondary to 
racial concerns. 164 The Fletcher court reiterated this in its opinion and 
conceded that several of Maryland's congressional districts were 
"unusually odd.,,165 In particular, Congressional District Three was 
-' "reminiscent of a broken-winged pterodactyl, lying prostrate across the 
center of the state.,,166 Despite its failed aesthetics, the court found no 
evidence of discriminatory intent. 167 The opinion noted broad support by 
the African-American community, the substantial involvement of 
African-Americans in the development of the map, and the relative 
proportionality of majority African-American districts to their share of 
the total population. 168 
The Fletcher plaintiffs contended that the "bizarre" boundaries in 
Maryland's 2012 Congressional District map not only indicated 
intentional discrimination, but violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act by diluting the voting strength of African-Americans in the state as a 
whole. 169 The Governor's map contained two African-American 
minority-majority districts, District Four (53.72%) and District Seven 
(53.75%).170 District Five was considered a minority "opportunity 
district" with a 37% African-American population. l7l According to the 
plaintiffs, three compact majority African-American districts could have 
Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. The court has found unconstitutional racial gerrymanders 
under the Fifteenth Amendment as early as 1960. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 354 U.S. 339 
(1960). The Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson decisions were based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 905; see Shaw, 509 U.S. at 
630. 
164 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. 
165 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 902003. The Fletcher court was especially critical of the 
Third Congressional District, and described the contours of the District in a footnote: "The 
Third District is rated at or near the bottom of all congressional districts [nationally 1 in 
multiple measures of statistical compactness." [d. at 902, n. 5. 
166 [d. at 902. 
167 [d. at 897. 
168 Id. at 902. Two African-American majority districts make up twenty-five percent of the 
state's eight districts. [d. African-Americans makeup twenty-eight percent of the total 
Eopulation in the state. [d. 
69 PI.'s Mem. in SUpp. of its Mot. for Prelim. Inj. as to Count Three and Six of the Compl., 
sUfra note 162, at 23. 
17 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 891. 
171 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count 
Three and Six of the Compl., supra note 162, at 18. See also, Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 902 
("The State Plan also creates two districts, the Second and the Fifth, with significant and 
growing minority populations. Assuming population trends remain consistent, both of these 
districts could conceivably elect minority candidates on the basis of majority/minority 
coalition voting"). 
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been drawn given the total African-American population of Maryland. 172 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that maximizing the 
number of minority-majority districts in a plan is not required under the 
Voting Rights Act or any other law, a state could be required to draw an 
additional minority-majority district where there has been a finding of 
minority vote dilution. 173 
The U.S. Supreme Court established a three-pronged preliminary test 
in Thornburg v. Gingles to determine when a vote dilution claim is 
valid. 174 Generally, a vote dilution claim is established when (1) racially 
polarized voting persists; (2) the minority group in question is politically 
cohesive; and (3) the group can form a relatively compact district that 
will allow them to elect candidates of their choosing.1 75 The analysis to 
determine vote dilution under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act can 
be performed by the officials responsible for redistricting or other 
stakeholders, but the determination almost always ends up in court for 
review. 176 
The Fletcher plaintiffs offered evidence to satisfy the three Gingles 
factors, which the court found lacking.l77 First, Plaintiffs submitted 
alternative maps that showed that a third, compact African-American 
congressional district could have been easily drawn in Maryland. 178 
Presumably, this went to prove that the minority population was 
politically cohesive and could be formed in a compact district, but the 
court took exception to this evidence and noted that compactness, in the 
context of Section Two, requires more than analysis of the shape of the 
proposed third district, but "compactness of the minority population 
itself.,,179 The Fletcher majority found that the state actually only had 
two distinct concentrations of African-Americans, one in the Baltimore 
172 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count 
Three and Six of the Compl., supra note 162, at 16. 
173 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,909 (1996). States have drawn majority-minority 
districts of varying shapes and compactness after determining that not drawing them would 
violate either section 2 or section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. 
174 See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
175 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. One of the Supreme Court's more steadfast rules are the so-
called Gingles factors. To make a prima facie case of minority vote dilution, minority 
plaintiffs must show "[they are] sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district ... [are] politically cohesive, ... and the white majority 
votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id. 
176 REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43 at 129 ("The trend toward litigation in state 
and federal courts continued from the 1990s, with a total of 41 states experiencing 
litigation in either state or federal courts, if not both. Of considerable interest, 28 states 
experienced some litigation in state court related to legislative redistricting. and an 
additional 19 had some state litigation related to congressional redistricting."). 
177 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 898-99. 
178 Id. at 897-98. 
179 Id. at 899. 
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region and the other in suburban Washington, D.C. ISO Any map with a 
third African-American majority congressional district would have to 
combine African-Americans from these two distinct areas. lSI While the 
Plaintiffs attempted to show homogeneity among both regions, the court 
disagreed, noting that "the differences between the two areas are real." IS2 
The court pointed out stark differences in the industry, culture and media 
markets of the Baltimore and Washington areas, and rejected the notion 
that they together "form a single community of interest."IS3 
The Fletcher plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claim identified the 
five congressional districts comprising the Western Maryland, Central 
Maryland and Baltimore regions as unconstitutional gerrymanders. IS4 
The Plaintiffs offered evidence that showed the district map was drawn to 
ensure a seven-to-one Democrat Party majority in the state's 
Congressional delegation. ls5 Because there is no specific precedent 
suggesting that partisan motives violate the u.s. Constitution, and there is 
no state or federal statute barring political motive when drawing 
Congressional boundaries, the plaintiffs could only rely on the Supreme 
Court's fragile majority in Vieth v. Jubelirer. IS6 That case continued to 
recognize the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, despite 
having utterly failed to establish an analytical framework from which it 
can intelligently identify an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.187 
Indeed, a plurality of the Vieth court lamented that there were "no 
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political 
gerrymandering claims. "IS8 
The Fletcher court similarly found no reliable standard by which to 
adjudicate the partisan gerrymandering claim.ls9 To persuade the 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 897. 
182 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 899. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC) found that two geographically separated Latino 
populations within a Texas majority-minority district were also socially distinct. League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,435 (2006). Thus, section two of the 
Voting Rights Act would not be satisfied by putting the two very different groups together in 
one district. See id. at 433-34. 
183 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 899-900 (also finding plaintiffs' proof of racially 
polarized voting lacking). Id. The court noted "high levels of white support for minority 
candidates in several races" and only "moderate" or occasional racial block voting." Id. 
184 Plaintiff's Complaint at 15, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) (No. 
11-3220). The analysis to determine vote dilution under Section Two of the Voting Rights 
Act is commonly performed by the officials responsible for redistricting or other stakeholders 
to assess their legal liability when formulating redistricting plans and courts have amassed a 
considerable body of precedent on the analysis required to support a Section Two claim. 
REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, supra note 43 at 64. 
185 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
186 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
187 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); see also Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
188 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
189 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
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Fletcher panel that the map's overriding goal was to increase partisan 
strength, plaintiffs relied only on Justice Stevens' dissent in Vieth. 190 
Despite Justice Stevens' position, it is well established that the Court has 
never considered political motivation by itself to be a suspect motive in 
redistricting. 191 The judiciary's acquiescence to the political nature of 
redistricting is much of the reason why redistricting map controversies 
were considered non-justiciable until Baker v. Carr. 192 
"One Person, One Vote" decisions by courts since Baker v. Carr have 
two parallel tracks by which the population equality standard for 
congressional redistricting plans are separate and distinct from that of 
legislative or other local electoral bodies' plans. 193 The Supreme Court 
first articulated this difference in standards in Wesberry v. Sanders. 194 
The reason for the difference can be found in the origin of the law that 
requires it. The Court's equal population requirement for legislative 
plans emanates from its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause. 195 Additionally, Article I, Section Two of the 
U.S. Constitution specifically requires that representatives be apportioned 
among the several states "according to their respective numbers.,,196 
This difference, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, results in a 
substantially equal population standard for state and local legislative 
bodies; and a strict equality population standard for congressional 
districts. 197 The stricter congressional standard points back to the direct 
Constitutional mandate, while the Court created the substantially equal 
standard. 198 The difference or variance between congressional district 
population totals must be minimal in order to avoid scrutiny by the 
courts. 199 
The Fletcher plaintiffs' equal population claim relied on the 
assumption that the state used impermissibly adjusted U.S. Census 
data.20o Thus, Maryland's 2012 Congressional Districts were severely 
190 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to Count 
Three and Six of the Compi., supra note 162, at 22. 
191 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
192 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198; but see Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 556. 
193 See generally Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973). 
194 Wesberry v, Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964). 
195 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1973). 
196 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
197 Howell, 410 U.S. at 322 ("Thus whereas population alone has been the sole criterion of 
constitutionality in congressional redistricting under Art. I, § 2, broader latitude has been 
afforded the States under the Equal Protection Clause in state legislative redistricting [ ... ] The 
dichotomy between the two lines of cases has consistently been maintained"). 
198 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 569 ("[T]he overriding objective must be substantial equality."). 
199 Howell, 410 U.S. at 320-22; see, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 742-51 (1973) 
(discussing state legislative redistricting plans where the difference or variance between 
district totals is 7.83%). 
200 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 893. 
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mal-apportioned and in violation of the strict equality standard.201 
According to the plaintiffs, if the total unadjusted population count from 
the Census was used, District Six is the biggest offender, with six 
thousand, nine hundred and nineteen persons over the ideal population 
tota1.202 District Seven was the second largest offender, with four 
thousand, six hundred and sixty-seven persons under the idea1.203 On the 
other hand, when the variance of the district is calculated based on 
adjusted data, the districts are perfectly balanced, to within one person in 
most districts.z04 
The simple question of the case becomes whether Article I, Section 
Two requires the State of Maryland to use the traditional, unadjusted data 
set from the U.S. Census Bureau.205 The plaintiffs read Karcher's "best 
population data available" standard, discussed above, as requiring use of 
unadjusted census data.206 The Fletcher court, however, chided the 
plaintiffs for failing to acknowledge the full context of Karcher; 
specifically that Karcher acknowledged that Census data could be 
modified to correct perceived flaws. 207 
The Fletcher majority also seemed to extract further meaning from 
both Karcher and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler.208 First, Fletcher 
acknowledged that census data should be used as a starting point, at least 
in congressional redistricting.209 Second, Fletcher stated that any 
adjustments must be documented and uniformly implemented.2lO Both 
201 Id. at 893. 
202 See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to 
Count Three and Six of the Complaint, supra note 162, at 4. 
203 See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for 
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Fletcher v. 
Lamone 831 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Md. 2011) (No. 11-3220) (A district's "ideal" population is 
determined by simply dividing the total population of a jurisdiction and dividing it by the 
number districts to be drawn); MD. DEP'T OF PLANNING, REPORT OF MD. PRECINCT 
POPULATION DATA: 2010 CENSUS, ADJUSTED MD. REDISTRICTING DATA & UNADJUSTED 
CENSUS POPULATION COUNT, App. A-3 (2010). available at 
http://www.mdp.state.md.usIPDF lRedistricting/20 1 Odatalprecinct/ AppA3 _ Adj. pdf. Before 
adjusting for prisoners, Maryland's total population was 5,773,552. Id. Its ideal 
congressional district population would have been 721,694. Id. After prisoner adjustment, the 
two numbers respectively were 5,772,231 and 721,529. /d. Seven districts in the 
Congressional map at issue have a population equal to the ideal, and District Eight contained 
one person less due to the odd state total. Id. 
204 See MD. DEP'T. OF PLANNING, MD. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, DEMOGRAPHIC TABLES: 
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS By COUNTY: POPULATION By RACE (2010), available at 
http://www.planning.maryland.govIPDFlRedistricting120 1 Odatalmd20 11_ congressional_sum 
maryJeportOct2011.pdf. 
205 Fletcher. 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95. 
206 Id. at 894; see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
207 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 738) 
208 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95 (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31, 534-
35;Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732, n. 4, 738). 
209 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 894. 
210 Id. at 894-95. 
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requirements show the court's concern for accuracy and reliability of the 
data being used, and echo the sentiments of past decisions that the best 
available data usually includes Census data in some form?11 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has long loathed to endorse voter registration as an 
acceptable population base but noted its close approximation to census 
data 212 
Fletcher then stated that the second part of the data question was 
Karcher's requirement that the adjusted data be relevant and 
systematically applied.213 The Fletcher majority pointed to the state's 
regulatory framework for reallocation and the well-documented process 
for obtaining, geocoding and adjusting the data.214 The plaintiffs did not 
challenge the states' reallocation process, but did suggest the state's 
actions were insufficient.215 Plaintiffs argued that if Maryland could 
legally adjust its census data to reallocate prisoners, it would have to do 
the same for other similarly situated, transient populations in the state.216 
Because the state did not address these comparable populations, its 
actions did not fulfill Karcher's requirement that adjustments in 
systematic manner?17 
The court confirmed that Karcher's endorsement of improved census 
data should not be read as a requirement for states to improve census data 
whenever possible. A Federal District Court in San Antonio, Texas, took 
a similar view in an unreported case regarding the State of Texas's failure 
to reallocate the state's prisoners before redistricting.218 Reallocation is 
consistent with equal population principles, but is not a requirement.219 
Thus, the best data available standard does not mean the best data 
possible standard. 
The Fletcher plaintiffs appealed the court's ruling as it pertained to 
their equal population claim to the U.S. Supreme Court.220 In June of 
2012, the court summarily affirmed the lower court's decision.221 During 
the summer of 2012, opponents of the map launched a successful 
211 Id. at 895 (citing City of Detroit v. Franklin, 4 F.3d 1367 (6th Cir.1993)). 
212 Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 95 (1966). 
213 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896. 
214 See id. ("The question remains whether Maryland's adjustments to census data were made 
in the systematic manner demanded by Karcher. It seems clear to us that they were."). 
'215 Id. 
216 Id. ("If Maryland wishes to correct for prisoner-related population distortions, it must also 
make similar adjustments to account for the distortionary effects of college students and 
members of the military."). 
217 Id. 
218 !d. at 895 (quoting Perez v. Texas, No. ll-Ca-360-0LG-JES-XR, slip op. at 24 (W.O. 
Tex. Sept. 2, 2011) ("[T]he State could enact a constitutional amendment or statute that 
modifies the count of prisoners as residents of whatever county they lived in prior to 
incarceration .. , [but] there is no federal requirement to do so."). 
219 Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 898-900. 
220 See generally Fletcher v. Lamone, No. 11-1178,2012 WL 1030482 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
221 !d. at *1. 
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campaign to petition the new congressional map to referendum.222 In 
July of 2012, the State Board of Elections certified the required number 
of signatures needed to place the redistricting question on Maryland's 
2012 election ballots.223 In the 2012 general election, Maryland voters 
approved of the re-drawn districts.224 
The Fletcher decision cemented the notion espoused by the voting 
rights cognoscenti that prisoner reallocation corrects distortions in 
electoral representation rather than magnifying them. What Fletcher did 
not do was endorse it as a requirement. 225 Instead, the Fletcher court took 
the middle-ground, reaffirming the role that state public policy plays in 
the redistricting process.226 
Fletcher recognized prisoner reallocation as a rational public policy 
that states can employ in the redistricting process.227 Prison populations 
distort representation, but not to the extent that it burdens equal 
representation rights protected by Article I, Section Two of the 
Constitution.228 Legitimate state policies that properly correct for this 
distortion in the redistricting process are permitted, but not mandated.229 
The Fletcher decision is a significant progression for a subject that has 
not seen much groundbreaking judicial interpretation since Shaw v. 
Reno.230 The decision preserves the historical prominence of Census data 
in redistricting, while acknowledging the growth and role technology can 
play in a state's quest for the best data available.231 
Courts and court watchers have long complained that redistricting is 
rife with political bedlam, some of which is the result of a healthy 
democratic system, and some that is rife with rancor and ineffectiveness. 
Maryland redistricting maps have had their share of judicial scrutiny over 
the years, and, as is the case with the great majority of redistricting 
controversies, courts must weigh the delicate balance between the healthy 
political prerogatives of the line drawer and the rules that keep them in 
check. Here, the court found no foul with the state's exercise of its 
222 Earl Kelly & Pamela Wood, Judge OKs Referendum on Congressional Map, CAPITAL 
GAZETTE, (Annapolis, MD), Aug. 11,2012, at AI. 
223 Letter from Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Md. State Bd. Of Elections, to Neil Parrott, 
Delegate (July 20, 2012) (certifying 59,201 signatures) (on file with author). 
224 Holly Nunn, Redistricting Withstands Ballot Challenge, Maps Upheld, THE GAZETTE 
(Gaithersburg, MD), Nov. 6,2012, 
http://www.gazette.netlarticle/20 1211 06INEWS1711 079552/-llredistricting-withstands-ballot-
challenge-maps-upheld&template=gazette. 
225 See Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 899-901. 
226 Id. at 903. 
227 Id. at 897. 
228 Nathaniel Persily, supra note 1, at 786-89. 
229 Id. at 788. 
230 See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (recognizing a cause of action under the 
Equal Protection Clause for white voters in oddly shaped majority-minority districts). 
231 See generally Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
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prerogatives.232 More importantly, the Fletcher decision solidified 
Maryland's success as the test case for prisoner reallocation policies 
nationwide. 
232 !d. at 904. 
